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Abstract. Mechanisms for the automation of uncertainty are required for expert systems. Sometimes these 
mechanisms need to obey the properties of probabilistic reasoning. We argue that a purely numeric 
mechanism, like those proposed so far, cannot provide a probabilistic logic with truth functional connec- 
tives. We propose an alternative mechanism, Incidence Calculus, which is based on a representation of 
uncertainty using sets of points, which might represent situations models or possible worlds. Incidence 
Calculus does provide a probabilistic logic with truth functional connectives. 
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I. Introduction 
Several mechanisms have been suggested for the automation of reasoning with 
uncertainty, e.g. Fuzzy Logic, [Zadeh 81], Shafer-Dempster theory, [Lowrance and 
Garvey 82], and the mechanisms proposed in MYCIN, [Shortliffe 76] and 
PROSPECTOR, [Duda et al. 78]. Most of these mechanisms involve assigning 
numbers to axioms (e.g. the facts and rules of an expert system), and assigning 
arithmetic functions to the rules of inference, so that new numbers can be calculated 
for the theorems that are derived from the axioms (e.g. the diagnoses of an expert 
system). We will call such mechanisms, purely numeric. 
We will see that it is a desirable property of any uncertainty mechanism that the 
connectives should be truth functional with respect to the uncertainty measures. That 
is, it should be possible to calculate the uncertainty measures of a complex formula 
solely from the uncertainty measures of its subformulae. Note that the Propositional 
Logic connectives are truth functional with respect to the truth values true and false. 
In some applications it is important to be able to assign meaning to the numbers 
so obtained, rather than use them merely to rank order some options. For instance, 
in medical diagnosis a user sometimes needs to be able to distinguish the situations 
where a diagnosis is very probably correct from the situation where it is just the best 
of an improbable batch. In the first case a surgeon might be prepared to perform a 
dangerous operation, in the second s/he might want to call for more tests and a 
re-diagnosis. In these situations we would like the numbers to represent probabilities. 
Unfortunately, we will see that the logical connectives cannot be truth functional 
with respect to probabilities, or any other purely numeric uncertainty measure. We 
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will propose a mechanism, called Incidence Calculus, in which the uncertainty 
measures are sets and for which the connectives are truth functional, and from which 
probabilities can easily be calculated. 
2. Probabilistic Reasoning 
What properties must probabilistic reasoning obey? These can be obtained from any 
testbook on mathematical probability, e.g. [Feller 68]. Adapting these properties to 
the needs of a logical calculus gives the set of equations given below. 
We associate uncertainty values with sentences, i.e. formulas with no free variables, 
in some logic, e.g. Predicate Logic. The probability of a sentence being true is a real 
number, between 0 and 1. We will use upper case letters from the beginning of  the 
alphabet to denote sentences, e.g. A, B, C, etc. and write p(A)  for the probability of  
A, etc. The probability of  a true sentence is 1, and the probability of a false sentence 
is 0. That is, 
p(t) = 1 and (i) 
p ( f )  = 0, (ii) 
where t represents the universally true sentence, andfrepresents  the universally false 
sentence. Values intermediate between 0 and 1 correspond to degrees of probability 
between these extremes. 
The following equations 
connectives. 
p ( ~  A) = 
p(A & B) 
p(A v B) 
assign arithmetic functions to the propositional 
1 - -  p ( A )  
= p(A).p(B) provided A and B are independent 




As we will see, the condition attached to equation (iv) is very important. It means 
that B is no more nor less likely given A than in general, and vice versa. It is this 
condition that will prevent purely numerical uncertainty mechanisms from having 
truth functional connectives, because the independence of  two sentences cannot be 
coded in their numerical values. 
3. The Limitations of a Purely Numeric Mechanism 
If we ignore the independence condition on equation (iv) then we get a contradictory 
calculus. The contradiction can be derived by applying the rules, unconditionally, to 
two dependent sentences, for instance A and ~ A. Suppose, for the sake of  definite- 
ness, that p(A)  = 0.75. Using the equations of  the last section we have the following 
derivation. 
p ( ~  A) = 1 - p(A)  = 0.25 (by (iii)) 
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p ( A &  ~ A) = p (A) .p (~A)  = 0.1875 
Similarly, 
p(A v ,,~ A) 
However, 
p(A & ~ A) 
and 
p(A v ~ A) 
but 
0.1875 4 : 0  
(by (v)) 
= p(A) + p ( ~ A )  - p ( A & A )  
= 0.8125 
(by (iv)) 
= p ( f )  = 0 (by (ii)) 
= p(t) = 1 (by (i)) 
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and 0.8125 4: 1, Contradiction! 
The contradiction cannot be avoided by modifying the arithmetic functions associ- 
ated with the connectives. We would have to modify the equations (v) and (iii) so that 
they gave value 0 when calculating the probability of  a sentence of  the form A & ~ B, 
where the probability of  both A and B is 0.75. But not all such sentences are false. We 
can summarise this result by saying that a purely numeric probability mechanism 
cannot have truth functional connectives. 
We need to design a mechanism which can take into account the degree of depen- 
dence of sentences when calculating their probabilities. In probability theory the 
correlation, c(A, B), between two sentences, A and B, is used to measure their degree of 
dependence. It varies between the values - 1 and 1. c(A, B) = 0 means A and B are 
independent, c(A, A) = 1 and c(A, --~ A) = - 1. The correlation is so defined that: 
p(A & B) = p(A).p(B) + c(A, B).~/p(A).p(~ A).p(B).p(,,~ B) (vi) 
This equation* provides an unconditional alternative to equation (iv), i.e. one 
without the condition that the conjuncts be independent. However, it does assume 
knowledge of  both the probabilities and the correlations of  the conjuncts. This 
assumption would not be unreasonable if we had a correlation + probability calculus 
with truth functional connectives, i.e. one which provided arithmetic functions for 
calculating the correlations of  complex sentences from the correlations and prob- 
abilities of  their subsentences, i.e. if we had functions which enabled the calculation 
of  e(A & B, C), c(A v B, C), c ( ~ A ,  C) and c(A ~ B, C) purely from p(A), p(B), 
p(C), e(A, B), c(A, C) and c(B, C). 
We will see in Section 6 that it is not possible to provide a correlation + probability 
calculus with truth functional connectives. So in order to use sentence (vi) it is 
necessary to be provided with the correlations of  all the infinitely many, possible pairs 
*Define a random variable V z on points such that VA(I ) = 1 ifA is true in land VA(I ) = 0 otherwise. Then 
E(A 2) = E(A) = p(A), and (vi) follows from the definition in [Feller 68] p. 236. 
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of sentences. This means that using correlations is not a feasible solution to the 
problems of  dependency in probability theory. 
4. A Set Theoretic Mechanism 
To design a mechanism which can deal with this problem we need to go back to the 
set-theoretic roots of probability theory. The probability of a sentence is based on a 
sample space of points [Feller 68]. Each point can be regarded as a situation, Tarskian 
interpretation, or possible world in which a sentence will be either true or false. The 
sample space is intended to be an exhaustive and disjoint set of  points. It will be 
denoted w. 
Non-trivial theories often have an infinite number of possible interpretations. For 
computational reasons we will usually require the sample space to be finite. Thus each 
point must sometimes stand for a, possibly infinite, equivalence class of interpret- 
ations. 
Let i(a) be the subset of w, containing all those points in which sentence A is true. 
We will call i(A), the incidence* of A. In [Feller 68] what we call an incidence is called 
an event: however, the term event is also used, ambiguously, to refer to sentences. The 
distinction between incidences and sentences is crucial in the discussion below, so we 
will not use the ambiguous term 'event'. 
The dependence or independence of two sentences is coded in the amount of 
intersection between their incidences. The amount of intersection of two independent 
sentences is no more or less than you would expect from a random assignment of the 
elements of  their incidences. 
For the rest of this paper we will assume the underlying logic to be Predicate Logic. 
The following axioms of Incidence Calculus associate a set theoretic function with 
each connective, propositional constant and quantifier of Predicate (Propositional) 
Logic so that the incidence of a complex sentence can be calculated from the inci- 
dences of its subsentences. We call the resulting system Predicate (Propositional) 
Incidence Logic. 
i(t) = w (vii) 
i ( f )  = { } (viii) 
i (~  A) = w\i(A) (ix) 
i(A & B) = i(A) ca i(B) (xi) 
i(A v B) = i(A) u i(B) (xi) 
i(VX A(X)) ~_ i(A(s)) ~_ i(3X A(X))  (xii) 
where s is a term containing no variables not bound in A(X).  Note that there is no 
independence condition on equations (vii) to (xi), and hence that all the connectives 
* I n c i d e n c e :  degree ,  ex tent  o r  f r equency  o f  occur rence ;  a m o u n t .  - Collins English Dictionary. 
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truth functional with respect to incidences. The axioms for the universal and existen- 
tial quantifiers only set upper and lower bounds, respectively, on their incidences, so 
the quantifiers are not truth functional with respect to incidences. This is not surpris- 
ing since they are not truth functional with respect to truth values either. 
If  J is a point, let Q(J) be the probability of  J occurring. If  I is a set of points, let 
wp(I) be the sum of  the probabilities of  the points i n / ,  i.e. 
wp(I) = ~ ( J )  
wp(I) is called the weighted probability of  L For computational reasons we will usually 
use finite/ ,  but the theory does not require I to be finite or even discrete. 
Since the sample space is meant to be an exhaustive and disjoint set of  points, we 
will require that: 
wp(w) = 1 
If A is a sentence, let p(A) be the probability of A occurring. We define 
p(A)  = wp(i(A)) 
If A and B are sentences, let p(AIB) be the conditional probability of A given B. We 
define: 
p(AIB) = wp(i(A) n i(B))/wp(i(B)) 
From these definitions it is easy to derive the probability equations of Section 2. 
p(t) = wp(i(t)) = wp(w) = 1 
p ( f )  = wp( i ( f ) )  = wp({ }) = 0 
p(,,~ A) = wp(i(,, ,  A)) = wp(w\ i (A) )  
= [wp(w) -- wp(i(A))] 
= 1 -  w p ( i ( A ) ) =  1 -  p(A)  
If  A and B are independent then B is true just as frequently if A is true as it is in 
general. This can be expressed mathematically as: 
wp(i(A & B))/wp(i(A))  = wp(i(B)) hence 
p(A & B) = wp(i(A & B)) 
= [wp(i(A)).wp(i(B))] 
= p(A).p(B) 
If  the weighted probability of points in which A is true is added to the weighted 
probability of points in which B is true then the weighted probability of  points in 
which both are true are counted twice. This can be expressed mathematically as: 
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hence, wp(i(A)) + wp(i(B)) = wp(i(A v B)) + wp(i(A & B)) 
p(A v B) = wp(i(A v B)) 
= [wp(i(A)) + wp(i(B)) - wp(i(A & B))] 
= p(A) + p(B) - p(A & 8) 
It follows that we can represent the probability of  a sentence, A, implicitly, by 
associating its incidence, i(A), with it. If we need to know the probability we can 
calculate wp(i(A)). 
We can also derive the standard definition of conditional probability. 
p(AIB) = wp(i(A) c~ i(B))/wp(i(B)) 
= wp(i(A & B))/wp(i(B)) 
p(A & B)/p(B) 
Hence, 
p(A & B) = p(B).p(AIB) 
so conditional probability provides an alternative to correlation for calculating the 
probability of a conjunction from the probability of  its conjuncts. However, a 
conditional probability + probability calculus with truth functional connectives is 
no more possible than a correlation + probability one, as we shall see in Section 6. 
5. The Representation of Incidences 
One of the advantages of  a purely numeric mechanism for uncertainty is that com- 
puters are particularly efficient at representing and manipulating numbers. They are 
not so efficient at representing and manipulating sets. 
However, Incidence Calculus can be implemented reasonably efficiently by 
representing the incidences of sentences as bit strings and manipulating them with 
logical operations. Each incidence can be represented by a bit string of a fixed length, 
say 100 bits, each bit corresponding to an element of w. The longer the string, the 
greater the accuracy, but the greater the cost in terms of space and time. Each bit in 
a string is 1 or 0 according to whether the element it corresponds to is or not in the 
incidence being represented. 
The incidence of A & B can then be calculated by taking the logical and of the 
incidences of A and B; the incidence of A v B can be calculated by taking the logical 
or of the incidences of  A and B; and the incidence of ~ A can be calculated by taking 
the logical not of the incidence of A. 
We will usually use uninterpreted points, i.e. points without any intended meaning. 
In this case we can chose their probabilities to be whatever is convenient. To simplify 
the calculation of sentence probabilities, the points of w can be taken as equi- 
probable, then: 
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- let n(S) be the number of  elements in set S. 
Since the points are equi-probable, for each point L ~(I) = 1In(w), 
hence, for each subset, S, of w, 
wp(S)  = n(S)/n(w) 
- so, for each sentence, A, 
p(A)  = n(i(A))/n(w) (xiii) 
We can now redo the calculations of Section 3, but using incidences rather than 
probabilities. Let w = {0, 1 . . . . .  99} which might be internally represented by a bit 
string, as described above. Using a w of size 100 will enable us to calculate prob- 
abilities to 2 decimal places. 
Suppose A is a sentence with probability 0.75. We will assign to A the incidence 
{0, 1 . . . . .  74}. Now using the incidence equations of  Section 4: 
i(..~A) = {75, 76 . . . . .  99} (by (ix)) 
{ } (by (x)) 
{0 ,  1 . . . . .  74, 75 . . . . .  99} (by ( x i ) )  
i(A & ,,~ A) = 
i(A v ~ A)  = 
hence, 
p(A & ..~ A) = 
and 
0 (by (xiii)) 
p(A v ~ A) = 1 (by(xiii)) 
which is as desired. 
However, if B is a sentence, independent of  A, with probability 0.25, p(A & B) is 
different from p(A & ,,~ A). Suppose we assign to B the incidence {0, 4, 8 . . . . .  96}, 
then: 
i ( A & B )  = {0 ,4 ,8  . . . . .  72} (by(x))  
hence, 
p(A & B) = 0.19 (by (xiii)) 
i (A v B) = {0, 1, 2 . . . . .  74, 7 6 , . . .  96} (by (xi)) 
hence, 
p(A v B) = 0.81 (by (xiii)) 
which is correct to 2 decimal places, as desired. 
If  the domain supports a more meaningful representation of points, then these can 
be used instead of  the equi-probable, uninterpreted points proposed above. For  
instance, in a domain involving time, it might be possible to specify a number of 
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hypothetical futures, e.g. it rains, it snows, there is sunshine, etc. It may then be 
possible to assign incidences to axioms in a principled manner. Note that it would still 
be possible to represent the incidences with bit strings. If these hypothetical futures 
are not equi-probable, then we must assign a probability to each of  them to enable 
wp(I) to be calculated for each incidence. When the incidences are meaningful to the 
user we might expect him/her to input them directly, rather than use probabilities. In 
this case we may not be interested in calculating probabilities at all. 
Incidences can be a more efficient method of  storing probabilistic information than 
probabilities. Consider the Propositional Incidence Calculus situation and suppose 
that we want to assign the probabilities of a set of sentences. Let this set contain n 
different propostions. If we are to conduct inference with these sentences then we may 
have to add new sentences to the set during inference, so we had better consider the 
set as containing all sentences constructable from the n propositions. If all sentences 
are put in conjunctive normal form we can see that there are 2 2~ different sentences 
altogether whose probability needs to be stored. However, I am reliably informed* 
that the probabilities of  all these sentences can be recovered provided the probabilities 
of all the 2" clauses are known. To store a decimal number of  m digits requires 10.m 
bits, thus 10.m.2 n are required altogether. To record a probability of m digits in an 
incidence requires a sample space of size 10 m, i.e. 10 m bits. But the incidences (and 
hence probabilities) of all sentences of the set can be recovered from the incidences 
of the n propositions, so only n.10 m bits are required altogether. In a typical expert 
system m will be very small compared with n (uncertainly measures are usually 
subjective so a value of m > 2 would be spurious accuracy, whereas n will have the 
same order of  magnitude as the number of  production rules), so 10m.n ,~ 10.m.2 n. 
Therefore, the minimum storage required for the incidences is significantly less than 
that required for probabilities. 
6. A Correlation 4- Probability Calculus Cannot Have Truth Functional 
Connectives 
We are now in a position to redeem the promise of Section 3 to show that a 
correlation + probability calculus cannot have truth functional connectives. In par- 
ticular, we will show that it is not possible to give equations which enable calcu- 
lation of c(A & B, C) purely from p(A), p(B), p(C), c(A, B), c(A, C) and c(B, C). 
To do this we need only exhibit two situations in each of  which the values ofp(A), 
p(B), p(C), c(A, B), c(A, C) and c(B, C) are identical but where c(A & B, C) has 
different values. Such a pair of situations is exhibited in the Venn diagrams of  
Figure. 1. 
In these situations w = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and each of these points is 
equi-probable. The incidences of A, B, C, A & B, etc. are assigned as in the diagram, 
e.g. i(A) = {0, 3, 4} and i(A & B) = {3} in situation 1. From these assignments we 
*D. M. Titterington, personal communication. 
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A Correlation + Probability Calculus cannot have truth functional connectives. 
can use sentences (xiii) and (vi) to calculate that: 
p(A) = p(B) = p(C) 
p(A & B) = p(B & C) 
Hence, 
= 0.3 in both situations and that 
= p(A & C) = 0.1 in both situations. 
= (0.1 - 0.3 • 0.3)/x/0.3 x 0.7 x 0.3 x 0.7 
= 0.047619 in both situations. 
But in situation I p ( A & B & C )  = 0, so 
c ( A & B , C )  = ( 0 - 0 . 1  x 0.3)/x/0.1 • 0.9 x 0.3 x 0.7 
- 0.21822 
and in s i t u a t i o n 2 p ( A & B & C )  = 0.1, so 
c ( A & B , C )  = (0.1 - 0.1 • 0.3)/~/0.1 x 0.9 x 0.3 x 0.7 
= - 0.50918 
Considered study of  this example should convince you that having different values 
ofc(A & B, C) for the same values ofp(A), p(B), p(C), c(A, B), c(A, C) and c(B, C) 
is not an exceptional situation, but rather the norm. So we cannot hope for a rough 
correlation calculus which would merely work most of the time. 
Neither can we hope for a calculus based on a modifed form of  correlation. To be 
useful any such function, d(X, Y), would have to enable p(X & Y) to be calculated 
purely from itself and p(X) and p(Y), as in sentence (vi). Thus d(X, Y) would be 
expressible purely in terms ofp(X),  p(Y) and p(X & Y). Hence, d(X & Y, Z) would 
be expressible purely in terms o f p ( X  & Y), p(Z) and p(X & Y & Z). The counter- 
example given in Figure 1 makes the values ofp(A), p(B), p(C), p(A & B), p(B & C) 
and p(A & C) identical in the two situations, but makes the values ofp(A & B & C) 
different. Thus d(A, B), d(B, C) and d(A, C) would be the same and d(A & B, C) 
would be different, however d(X, Y) was defined. 
c(a, B) = c(B, c )  = c(A, c )  
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For instance, suppose d were conditional probability. Now p(AIB) = p(.41C) = 
p(BIA) = p(BIC) = p(CIA) = p(CFB) = 0.333 . . .  in both situations in Figure 1, 
but p(A & BIC) = 0 in situation 1 and 0 . 3 3 3 . . .  in situation 2. Thus a conditional 
probability + probability calculus would not have truth functional connectives 
either. 
Note that the example also shows that the probabilities of all the sentences in the 
set cannot be calculated from the probabilities and correlations (or conditional 
probabilities) of just the propositions in the set. Thus the recording of  correlations (or 
conditional probabilities) together with probabilities will not require storage space 
less than that for incidences. 
7. Inference Under Uncertainty 
Any calculus for uncertainty reasoning needs to provide some mechanims for inherit- 
ing uncertainty values from the hypothesis of  an inference step to the conclusion, i.e. 
if we know the uncertainty of A and A ~ B then we need to be able to calculate the 
uncertainty of B when modus ponens is appl!ed. By analogy with the truth func- 
tionality of Propositional Logic, we will call this property of  a calculus proof 
functionality. 
However, this proof  functional criterion is too strong and must be relaxed in 
general. Consider the case of  modus ponens, B may be derivable in several ways, e.g. 
from C and C ~ B. Any particular derivation can only provide a lower bound on the 
certainty of B. But we would like to make this lower bound as tight as possible, i.e. 
to make the calculus as proof  functional as possible. 
In Incidence Calculus the uncertainty of a sentence is its incidence. In general, if 
A F Bis a rule of inference of a logical system then all we can infer is that i(A) ~ i(B); 
if A is true in some point then B will be true in that point. Each derivation of  B 
provides a new lower bound for its incidence. The greatest lower bound is found by 
taking the union of these lower bounds. This is iegitimised by the set theoretic 
theorem. 
Ll ~ I & L 2 ~ I .-~ Ln u L 2 ~ I 
where I is the incidence and L~ and L2 two lower bounds. 
The maintenance of  a lower bound of  the true incidence is in the same spirit that 
MYCIN amalgamates the certainty factors calculated from different derivations of 
the same conclusion, except that the MYCIN amalgamation algorithm is ad-hoc 
whereas ours is justified by set theory. 
In Shafter-Dempster theory both a lower and an upper bound are maintained, 
[Lowrance and Garvey 82]. The lower bound, Spt(A), represents the degree to which 
the evidence supports A; the upper bound, PIs(A), represents the degree to which the 
evidence fails to refute A. 
In some cases inference steps are proof  functional, e.g. when deriving A & B from 
A and B then i(,4 & B) = i(A) n i(B). Note that in a probability calculus 
INCIDENCE CALCULUS 273 
?(A & B) = p(A).p(B) + c(A, B)..,/p(A).?(~ A).p(B).p(~ B) 
where c(A, B) can vary between - I and + I, so for given p(A) and p(B), p(A & B) 
can take a range of values, Thus a probability calculus would not be proof functional 
in this case. We can rephrase this observation by saying that in order for an uncer- 
tainty mechanism to be proof functional for this rule of inference it is necessary that 
& be truth functional with respect to the uncertainty measure. & is truth functional 
with respect to incidences but not probabilities. Similar remarks will hold for any rule 
of inference in which the hypotheses are all subformulae of the conclusion. This 
emphasises the importance of the connectives being truth functional with respect to 
the uncertainty measure. 
In general, the lower bounds provided by Incidence Calulus are much tighter than 
those provided by a purely numeric probability calculus because the connectives are 
truth functional with respect to incidences but not to probabilities. 
The Rules of Inference of Predicate Calculus preserve truth, i.e. if the hypothesis 
is true in some interpretation then the conclusion is true in that interpretation. Thus 
we might have a rule A & B I- A, but not a rule A I- A & B. However, in an uncertainty 
calculus, we can extend the notion of rule of inference to include both of these rules: 
while the first, given i(A & B), provides a new lower bound for i(A), the second, given 
i(A) provides a new upper bound for i(A & B). If we are only given upper and lower 
bounds for the hypotheses then both rules provide both new upper and new lower 
bounds for their conclusions. 
An inference engine for an Incidence Logic can and should exploit this extended 
notion of rule of inference operating on upper and lower bounds of the incidences of 
the sentences of the logic. The Legal Assignment Finder of section 8 provides such an 
inference engine for Propositional Incidence Logic. It is a extension of the Beth's 
Semantic Tableau and is shown to be complete for Propositional Incidence Logic in 
[Bundy 85]. 
The Legal Assignment Finder incorporates rules of inference corresponding to each 
of the connectives, for inheriting both upper and lower bounds and going in both 
directions. That these connectives are truth functional with respect to incidences is a 
direct contribution to the proof functionality of the inference engine. 
The Legal Assignment Finder is input an initial assignment of upper and lower 
bounds for the incidences of a set of sentences in Propositional Logic. It uses rules of 
inference to specialize this initial assignment to just those legal assignments of inci- 
dences to these sentences. Suppose F is an assignment, then it defines the functions 
supe and infF from sentences to incidences. The former gives the upper bound and 
the latter the lower bound. 
For instance, there is a rule of inference 
Andl: supG(A) = [sup~(A & B) u w\infr(B)] c~ supr(A) 
where assignment G is a specialization of assignment F. The justification of this rule 
is that since 
i(A & B) ~_ supr(.4 & B) and 
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But 
and 
w\i(B) ~ w\infF(B) then 
i(A & B) u w\i(B) ~ supr(A & B) w w\infe(B) 
i(A) ~_ i(A & B) u w\i(B) 
i(A) ~_ supF(A) 
Therefore 
supF(A) = [SUpe(A & B) u w\infF(B)] C~ supr(A) 
The Legal Assignment Finder has 4 such rules for negation and 6 each for conjunc- 
tion, disjunction and implication. 
8. The Legal Assignment Finder 
The purpose of the Legal Assignment Finder is to find all the legal specializations of 
an initial assignment. Only a consistent initial assignment will have any. 
This could be done by finding all specializations by case analysis and then rejecting 
those that are not legal, but this would be unnecessarily inefficient. Instead, it 
interleaves the legality test with the case analysis. The legality test is done by the set 
of rules of inference mentioned above. They are used to infer the consequences of an 
assignment around the sentences, tightening the sup and inf bounds of each. 
Sometimes this inference specializes the initial assignment into a legal or contradic- 
tory assignment without case analysis but, in general, case analysis is required. 
DEFINITION 1: Types of Assignment. An assignment F is called total iff for all A 
infF(A) = supF(A). In this case we introduce a third mapping iF from sf(S) to w, 
where sf(S) is the set of sentences S and their subsentences, such that 
iF(A ) = infv(A) = supr(A) for all A ~ sf(S). 
it(A) is called the incidence of A in F. 
An assignment F is called legal iff it is total and i F obeys the axioms of Incidence 
Calculus for sf(S) and w. 
An assignment F is called contradictory iff for some A infr(A) ~ SUpF(A ). 
An assignment F is a specialization of an assignment G iff 
inf.(A) ~ infF(A) and 
supe(A) ~ supa(A) for all A ~ sf(S) 
An assignment F is a proper specialization of an assignment G iff 
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F is a specialization of G and 
inf,(A) c infr(A) or 
supp(A) c sups(A) for some A ~ sf(S)  
An assignment F is consistent iff it has a legal specialization. 
Note that specialization and proper specialization are transitive and reflexive. 
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DEFINITION 3: The Rules of  Inference. A rule of inference is a mapping from 
assignments to assignments. Let F be the assignment before the rule fires and G be the 
assignment afterwards. In each case, G is the same as F except for the changes, on 
some particular formula, defined below for each rule. 
Notl :  supa(A) = 
Not2: infG(A) = 
Not3: supa(,-~A) 
Not4: infG(~A) 
Andl:  supa(A) = 
And2: infG(A ) = 
And3: supa(B) = 
And4: infc(B) = 
[w\infr('-~ A)] n supr(A) 
[w\supr('-~ A)] u infr(A) 
= [w\infe(A)] n supr(~A)  
= [w\supF(A)] U infr('-~ A) 
[supF(A & B) u w\infF(B)] n supE(A) 
infF(A & B) w infe(A) 
[supe(A & B) u w\infe(A)] n supF(B) 
infF(A & B) u infF(B) 
DEFINITION 2: The Legal Assignment Finder. To apply the Legal Assignment 
Finder to assignment F: 
1. Let F be the current assignment. 
2. Until the current assignment is contradictory or there are no rules in the queue 
then: 
(a) Pick a rule from the queue and apply it to the current assignment. 
(b) Let the resulting assignment be the new current assignment. 
Let the current assignment be G. 
3. If  G is contradictory then exit with result { }, 
4. Otherwise, if G is total then exit with result {G}. 
5. Otherwise, split G into cases G 1 and G 2. 
6. Apply the Legal Assignment Finder to G 1 with result setl. 
7. Apply the Legal Assignment Finder to G2 with result set2. 
8. Exit with result setl u set2. 
The results of inference are given below. There are more rules than strictly required 
to test for legality, but the additional results are valuable in helping to avoid cases 
analysis. 
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And5: sup~(A & B) = SUpF(A) c~ supv(B) c~ SUpF(A & B) 
And6: infG(A & B) = [infF(A) c~ infF(B)] U infF(A & B) 
For  conciseness we omit the rules for disjunction and implication, but these can be 
easily derived from the ones above. 
DEFINITION 4: Contribution of a Rule. Note that each rule has the form: 
supG(A) . . . .  • SUpF(A) or 
inf,(A) . . . .  u infF(A) 
We call t h e . . ,  part of the rule its contribution. 
These rules are applied to an assignment using the following procedure. 
DEFINITION 5: Rule Firing. To apply a rule to assignment F to produce assign- 
ment G. 
1. Remove the rule from the queue. 
2. Evaluate the right hand side of  the rule. 
3. If  the result gives a new value for the sup or inf of A, then find all rules which 
can be instantiated to have the new value in their contributions, and queue those 
instances. 
4. Exit with assignment G. 
Before the inference process can begin all the relevant rules must be queued. This 
is done by the following procedure. 
DEFINITION 6: Initialization. Let S be the set of sentences we are interested in, and 
sf(S) be the set of these sentences and all their subsentences. 
To initialize sf(S) with assignment F: 
Set up an empty queue. 
For each sentence A ~ sf(S): 
1. If infr(A) 4: { } then queue all instances of  rules with infe(A) in their contribu- 
tions. 
2. If  SUpe(A) ~ w then queue all instances of rules with supF(A) in their contri- 
butions. 
Case splitting is necessary when the inference process runs out of rules to fire 
without specializing the assignment to a total or contradictory one. It is done by 
picking a point and considering the two cases (1) that it is not and (2) that it is in the 
incidence of a sentence. 
DEFINITION 7: Case Splitting. To split G into cases G 1 and G2 
1. Since G is not total and not contradictory there exists an A ~ sf(S) such that 
inf~ ( A ) c  sups(A) 
2. Choose j e supG(A)\infG(A) non-deterministically. 
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3. Let GI and G2 be the same as G except that: 
supa,(A) = supG(A)\{j} 
infa2(A) = info(A) w {j} 
4. Find all rules which can be instantiated to have supo~ (A) in their contributions 
and queue those in case G 1. 
5. Find all rules which can be instantiated to have infa2(A) in their contributions 
and queue those instances in case G2. 
This completes the definition of the Legal Assignment Finder. It has been 
implemented in Prolog by the author. Various theoretic properties of  this algorithm 
are proved in [Bundy 85]. In particular, we show it complete for Propositional 
Incidence Logic. We also show that it degenerates into a tautology checker when w 
is a singleton, and that, therefore, it is at least exponential in the size of the sentences 
in the input set, and that a complete polynomial algorithm is highly unlikely to exist. 
The following illustrates the performance of the algorithm. 
Suppose w = {L k, l} and i(,-~ (a & ,-~ b)) = {j, k}. 
Assign all proper subsentences, B, of ~ (a & ~ b) 
the default assignment of sup(B) = w and inf(B) = { }. 
Then: 
rule Notl  assigns 
rule Not2 assigns 
{I} to sup(a & ,-~ b). 
{1} to inf(a & ~ b). 
rule And2 assigns {l} to inf(a). 
rule And4 assigns {l} to inf(~ b). 
rule Notl  assigns {j, k} to sup(b). 
No further inference is possible without case splitting. 
For instance, {l} __q i(a) ~_ {j, k, l}. 
We could consider the cases 
1. {l} _ i(a) ~_ {j, l} 
2. {l, j} ~_ i(a) ~_ {j, k, l} 
and then continue the inference process in each case. 
In Predicate Incidence Logic no complete terminating algorithm exists. Such an 
algorithm would have to degenerate into a complete terminating algorithm for 
detecting contradictions in standard Predicate Calculus, and this task is known to be 
semi-decidable. However, we can extend the Legal Assignment Finder to an incom- 
plete inference engine for the Predicate Incidence Logic with the following rules of  
inference. 
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D E F I N I T I O N  8: Predicate Incidence Logic Rules of  Inference: 
sup~(VX A(X)) = SUPr(A(s)) n supe(VX A(X)) All 1: 
All2: inf~(A(s)) = 
Existl: supG(A(s)) = 
Exist2: infG(3X A(X)) 
infF(VX A(X) w infr(A(s)) 
SUPF(3X A(X)) n supr(A(s)) 
= infr(A(s)) u infF(SX A(X)) 
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where s is a term containing no variables not bound in A(X) 
Note that some mechanism is required to control the introduction of  new terms s, i.e. 
to introduce new sentences of  the form A(s). In contrast to the Propositional case the 
set of  sentences may grow during the course of  the inference. 
9. Maintaining Consistency 
I f  the user of  an expert system based on Incidence Calculus is able to assign incidences 
in an uncontrolled manner, then it is possible to make an inconsistent assignment. For 
instance, it follows from the equations of  Incidence Calculus that: 
w\i(A) ~_ i(A ~ B) 
so A ~ B cannot be assigned an incidence independently of  A. Suppose that w = 
{L k, l} and the user assigns i(A) = {j} and i(A ~ B) = {j, k}, then: 
{j} = i(A) 
~_ i(A) n i(,,~ B) 
= i ( A &  ,.~B) 
= i(,.~ (A -* B)) 
= w\i(A ~ B) 
= {j, k, l}\{j, k} 
= { l }  
so, {j} ~_ {l}, which is a contradiction. 
This possibility of  building an inconsistent theory is true of  any theory, but is 
particularly easy to do unintentionally in Incidence Calculus. 
In Propositional Incidence Calculus, if w is finite, these inconsistencies can be 
detected by the Legal Assignment Finder. 
On the problem above this algorithm makes the following calculations:* 
sup(A) = {j} 
inf(A) = {j} 
*For simplicity we have omitted the assignment subscripts on sup and inf. Successive groups of lines 
represent successive assignments. 
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sup(A-~B) = {j ,k}  
i n f (A- ,B)  = {j,k} 
sup(B) = w 
inf(B) = { } 
sup(A) = [w\({j, k} n w\w)] n {j} = {j} 
inf(A) = (w\{j, k}) w {j} = {l,j} 
inf(A) ~ sup(A) 
Therefore, exit with result { }, indicating an inconsistent initial assignment. 
Note that this example does not involve case analysis. In [Bundy 85] we have 
proposed that a version of the Legal Assignment Finder without case analysis be used 
for consistency checking. We call this algorithm the Inconsistency Detection 
Algorithm. This is computationally much cheaper and picks up all of the straight- 
forward inconsistencies. 
10. Assigning Incidences 
To initialize an incidence based system, sentences must be given as axioms and 
incidences must be assigned to them. In expert systems like MYCIN the initial 
assignment of numerical 'uncertainty factors' is made subjectively by the user. 
If we assume that users are prepared to assign probabilities (numbers) to axioms, 
but not incidences (sets), then our task is to convert probabilities into incidences. 
Since incidences incorporate more information about the sentences than probabilities, 
namely the degree of independence of the sentences, we must either make assumptions 
about this extra information or provide a mechanism for the user to input it. For 
instance, we would assume that each axiom is as independent of the others as is 
allowed by the equations of Incidence Calculus. This problem is discussed and an 
algorithm proposed in [Corlet and Todd 85]. Alternatively, we could allow the user 
to supply sufficient correlations of conditional probabilities between sentences to 
uniquely determine the assignment of incidences. 
If assumptions are made in the assignment of incidences then an inconsistent 
assignment of incidences may be made, even though the probability assignment is 
consistent. An inconsistent assignment of incidences can be detected by running the 
Legal Assignment Finder on the current assignment or the cheaper, but incomplete, 
Inconsistency Detection Algorithm. In the latter case we may not detect inconsistency 
even though it is present. If consistency is detected then it is necessary to back up and 
remake one of the incidence assignments, relaxing one of the assumptions (e.g. of 
independence). This is computationally very expensive since we must save back-up 
points during incidence assignment. When all back-up points are exhausted then the 
original probability assignment must have been inconsistent, so the user must be 
informed and asked to remake it. 
Although, initially, some sentences may be assumed independent, the Legal Assign- 
ment Finder will still detect dependences between sentences and will assign incidences 
to reflect this dependence. For instance, consider the example at the end of Section 
280 ALAN BUNDY 
5; the assignments to A and B reflect their independence, but the assignment to ~ A 
reflects its dependence on A. Once the assignment to A had been made the assignment 
to ~ A would be automatically made by rules Not3 and Not4 of the Legal Assignment 
Finder. 
Note that to determine uniquely the incidences of all sentences in some set it is not 
enough to know the probabilities and correlations (or conditional probabilities) of 
just the propositions in the set. For instance, consider the situations described in 
Figure 1 and suppose that the following information were all available: 
p(A) = p(B) = p(c) = 0.3 and 
c(A, B) = c(B, C) = c(C, A) = 0.47619 or equivalently 
p(AIB) = p(AIC) = p(BIA) = p(BIC) = p(CIA) = p(CIB) = 0.333.. 
then both the assignments given in Figure 1 are legal, i.e. they both fit the numbers 
above. However, they yield different values for p(A & B & C), namely 0 and 0.1, 
respectively. If situation 1 is chosen, but 0.1 is later assigned to p(A & B & C) then 
the Inconsistency Detection Algorithm will detect an inconsistency, even though the 
probabilities, correlations and conditional probabilities assigned are not, in fact, 
contradictory. Backtracking would be required to find the consistent assignment, 
situation 2. 
It is unclear how much information is required to determine uniquely the incidences 
in a set of sentences. It may well be that the correlations (or conditional probabilities) 
are required of all pairs of sentences in the set - even of those sentences whose 
probability is to be determined. Note that in the Predicate Incidence Logic case, this 
set is potential infinite, so even the storage of these correlations would be impossible, 
let alone the acquisition. 
An alternative solution is to assign incidences directly, rather than via probabilities 
and correlations. These incidences might be subjective or objective. Subjective 
incidences would be estimated by the expert or user, just as uncertainty numbers 
usually are in expert systems. Objective incidences would be provided by data from 
field studies, just as objective probabilities are provided in Bayesion decision aids.* 
The human provider'of subjective incidences would have to be presented with some 
sample space, w, of incidents from which to chose. In practice, w would have to be 
small and might be presented in some graphic form, e.g. a screen divided up into an 
array. It would help if the incidents were meaningful to the human and related to the 
domain, e.g. days of the week. The Inconsistency Detection Algorithm could track the 
assignment and warn of any inconsistency. Empirical studies are required to see 
whether this is feasible. It is known that humans often object to providing uncertainty 
numbers; would incidences be better or worse? 
The provision of objective incidences involves less statistical analysis than the 
provision of objective probabilities. Each set of identical experiments becomes an 
incident and is stored in the incidence of those formulae that were true in the 
*I  am indebted to Richard O'Keefe for suggesting using objective incidences. 
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experiments. One does not need to calculate the probability of the formulae, but one 
does need to estimate the probability of the individual incidents. If each experiment 
is considered equi-probable then the probability of each incident can be calculated 
from the number of experiments in its set. One also needs to assume that these 
incidents cover all the cases. 
Whether subjective or objective incidents are used, the assumption of equi-probable 
incidents will almost certainly need to be dropped. This does not entail a great cost. 
The representation of incidences as bit-strings can still be maintained, but the calcu- 
lation of probabilities from them is a little more complicated (see Section 4 for the 
details). This calculation does not need to be done very often, for instance, only when 
the final diagnosis is being output, if then. 
11. Related Work 
It is interesting to compare the Incidence Calculus with the Probabilistic Logic of 
Nilsson, [Nilsson 84]. In Probabilistic Logic, points are partially-specified Herbrand 
Models, i.e. they are vectors of truth assignments to a finite sequence of sentences. 
Thus the incidence of each sentence consists of those points with the value 'true' in 
the vector slot corresponding to that sentence. The following calculation is used to 
find the probability of a new sentence, given the probabilities of some old sentences. 
(a) Construct all the points for the set of old and new sentences. 
(b) Make an assignment of probabilities to each point which will yield the given 
probabilities of the old sentences. 
(c) Use this assignment to calculate the probability of the new sentences. 
Step (b) above is computational impractical in general. Nilsson suggests various ways 
to circumvent it in special cases. We avoid this problem by using uninterpreted points 
rather than using Herbrand Models, as Nilsson does. The probability of each of our 
points is set to 1In(w), and hence an impractical calculation is avoided. Instead of 
fixing the probabilities of the sentences by adjusting the probability of the points, it 
is done by adjusting the size of their incidences, and this is a much less expensive 
calculation. 
The storage of sup(A) and inf(A) rather than/(A) is very similar to the storage of 
the interval [Spt(A),PIs(A)] in Shafer-Dempster theory rather than the probability, 
p(A). In fact, 
Spt(A) = n(inf(A))/n(w) and 
Pls(a) = n(sup(A))/n(w) 
So Incidence Calculus can easily be adapted to provide a mechanism for dealing with 
the problem of dependent sentences in Shafer-Dempster theory, instead of in prob- 
ability theory. Instead of assigning i(A) on the basis ofp(A) we would want to assign 
sup(A) and inf(A) on the basis of Pls(A) and Spt(A), and instead of calculating and 
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outputting the probability of any inferred conclusion we would output a range of 
probabilities. 
12. Conclusion and Further Work 
In this note we have described a mechanism, Incidence Calculus, for incorporat- 
ing probabilistic reasoning in an inference system. This mechanism is based on 
the assignment of sets of points to sentences, rather than the normal technique of 
assigning numbers to sentences. Our mechanism provides a probabilistic logic with 
truth functional connectives. A purely numeric mechanism cannot provide this. 
Because of this property, Incidence Calculus provides tighter bounds on the 
probabilities of inferred sentences than could be provided by such a numberic 
mechanism. 
Incidence Calculus can be implemented reasonably efficiently using bit strings. It is 
then a more efficient technique for storing the probabilities of sentences than a purely 
numeric mechanism, especially if the dependencies between sentences must also be 
stored. 
There is a problem over the initial assignment of incidences to sentences. An initial 
assignment of probabilities is not enough to determine uniquely the incidences. 
Pairwise correlations or conditional probabilities are also required between all sen- 
tences in the input set. In the Predicate Incidence Logic case this set is potentially 
infinite. Either one must make an initial assignment and be prepared to remake it 
when further information is available or incidences must be input directly. 
We have presented a complete inference engine for Propositional Incidence Logic, 
the Legal Assignment Finder, and outlined the extensions required to extend this into 
an inference engine for Predicate Incidence Logic. More work is required to explore 
the theoretical properties of this extended engine, e.g. completeness and soundness, 
and to implement and test it. 
Incidence Calculus can be readily adapted to Shafer-Dempster Theory, i.e. to 
returning an interval of probabilities rather than a single value. 
Some of the mechanisms described in this paper have been implemented. Further 
implementation and testing is required. 
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